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ATTACKS ON EXECUTIVES: REVIVAL OF THE INVASION OF 
MANAGEMENT DEFENSE AND PUBLIC UTILITY AUTONOMY 
As the Chief Executive Officer of Westar Energy, Inc., James Haines Jr. 
oversees the largest power company in Kansas, a company that provides power 
to a good portion of Kansas and parts of several other states.  Through years of 
education and experience working in this field and with this company, Mr. 
Haines has gained a deeper understanding of the business needs that present 
themselves on a day-to-day basis.  Armed with this knowledge and the support 
of shareholders and employees throughout the company, Mr. Haines provides 
business decisions that aim at improving Westar’s profitability. 
Now consider that a commission composed of appointed officials, lacking 
the experience and knowledge specific to Westar’s management, second-
guesses Mr. Haines’s managerial decisions and stipulates how Westar will 
finance its business.  Originally implemented to protect the public from rate 
increases, this commission slowly usurps the role of Westar’s executives and 
begins to effectively “manage” portions of Westar’s electric business. 
The scenario just presented is occurring in some form on a day-to-day 
basis in almost every state and is threatening the autonomy of management in 
the public utility industry.  In the wake of Enron, WorldCom, and the 
California energy crisis, business decisions are viewed with great skepticism.1  
As a consequence of this heightened scrutiny, public utility companies like 
Westar are increasingly subjected to more intrusive regulation than ever before 
in an effort to protect the best interests of the public.  Furthermore, public 
utility commissions (hereinafter referred to generally as “commissions”), 
originally designed to prevent unconscionable rate increases, have started to 
 
 1. See Rebecca Smith, Shock Waves: Enron’s Swoon Leaves a Grand Experiment in a State 
of Disarray, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2001, at A1 (describing the uncertainty in the energy market 
since the fall of Enron and the California energy crisis).  California was the first large state to 
deregulate its electricity market, and since this time, prices have spiked higher than forty percent, 
and there have been a series of intermittent blackouts.  Id.  General Electric Co. Chairman and 
Chief Executive Jeffrey Immelt recently spoke to shareholders in the wake of the Enron collapse 
and described the widespread uncertainty in today’s market that has lead to the increased 
skepticism of public utility companies.  Rachel Emma Silverman, GE’s Immelt Says Lowered 
Stock Price Upsets Him, Too, WALL ST. J., Apr. 25, 2002, at A6.  “We live in a new age,” he 
stated.  Id.  “Performance is not enough.  When a trillion or so in New Economy market cap goes 
up in smoke.  When advisers rate a stock a ‘buy’ and it goes bankrupt a couple weeks later.  
When the system designed to provide confidence in the numbers falls apart.  It changes things.”  
Id. 
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exude greater control over the internal operations of public utilities.  In order to 
effectively balance a commission’s goals and those of a public utility, courts 
must develop a usable test that can be uniformly applied. 
Regulatory bodies are generally viewed as beneficial to the public, but 
many people fail to realize the entire scope of their impact on ratepayers, and 
subsequently on the economy.  When public utilities suffer from tight control 
and a restriction of management’s judgment, the ratepayers can be 
inadvertently harmed.  Corporate budgets are restricted, maintenance and 
construction are reduced, people lose their jobs, and the utility industry suffers 
due to the increased regulation by commissions.2  The United States Supreme 
Court has stated: “It must never be forgotten that, while the state may regulate 
with a view to enforcing reasonable rates and charges, it is not the owner of the 
property of public utility companies, and is not clothed with the general power 
of management incident to ownership.”3  State courts have followed this 
directive.  For example, the Supreme Court of Wyoming announced: “Not only 
is the participation by a state agency in a utility’s business decisions 
unnecessary to regulation, it is impermissible.”4 
From this rationale emerged what is commonly referred to as the “Invasion 
of Management” defense.  While this defense recognizes that regulatory 
commissions have authority to protect ratepayers from rate hikes, it also limits 
commissions’ power.  In its simplest form, the Invasion of Management 
defense prevents commissions from inhibiting expansion, acquisitions, and 
financing options that are viewed by management as necessary business 
activities.5 
In Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Public Service 
Commission,6 the Supreme Court of Wyoming recognized that some courts 
were starting to restrict the Invasion of Management defense.  The court 
explained that “in General Telephone Company of California v. Public 
Utilities Commission the court said ‘that the “invasion of management” 
rationale now appears to be disfavored’ because judicial limitations were 
increasingly imposed upon what once had been perceived as within 
‘management functions’ of utilities.”7 
 
 2. The utilities industry employed 666,200 people in 1995, however, this figure has 
declined to 570,200 in 2004.  U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, INDUSTRY 
AT A GLANCE: NAICS 48-49 & 22: TRANSPORTATION AND WAREHOUSING, AND UTILITIES, 
available at http://www.bls.gov/iag/transportutil.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2006). 
 3. Missouri ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276, 289 (1923). 
 4. Pac. Power & Light Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 677 P.2d 799, 810 (Wyo. 1984) (Rose, 
J., specially concurring). 
 5. See id. at 807–09 (majority opinion). 
 6. 745 P.2d 563 (Wyo. 1987). 
 7. Id. at 569 (quoting 670 P.2d 349, 354 n.10 (Cal. 1983)) (internal citation omitted). 
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However, Wyoming’s high court went on to conclude that 
  [t]his prognostication by the Supreme Court of California may not be 
entirely accurate.  It does not cognize a rather delicate but definite line that 
must be drawn between regulated but free enterprise and socialization.  Free 
enterprise assumes the responsibility of management to investors for 
management’s decisions.  Permitting civil servants to make those 
determinations instead of management results in no accountability for those 
decisions to investors in the business.  That is not compatible with even 
regulated monopolies in a free enterprise system.  We prefer the view 
heretofore espoused that extensions of power by judicial construction beyond 
that conferred upon an agency by the legislature, either specifically or 
generally, is inappropriate because: 
  “An administrative board has no power or authority other than that 
particularly conferred upon it by statute or by construction necessary to 
accomplish the aims of the statute.”8 
This Comment will explain why the Invasion of Management defense is 
not extinct and illustrate how it serves as a more doctrinally sound approach to 
interpreting how far a public utility commission’s power extends.  To do so, 
this Comment will first analyze the composition of public utility companies 
and the role the Invasion of Management defense plays in preserving this 
structure.  Next, this Comment will take a look at some of the important 
opinions throughout history that have shaped and defined the Invasion of 
Management defense.  Finally, this Comment will walk through a recent 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) order and analyze the present 
and future application of the Invasion of Management defense to this decision. 
I.  THE STRUCTURE OF PUBLIC UTILITIES AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE INVASION 
OF MANAGEMENT DEFENSE 
The United States operates under a free-market economy.  In its purest 
form, market forces (supply and demand) and governmental regulation 
determine the level of output and the ultimate price of goods.  Business in the 
United States has long operated under this framework, with management 
tailoring its competitive decisions to this model.  Moreover, “[e]conomists and 
other policy experts around the world are increasingly skeptical about the 
necessity and effectiveness of government regulation and more confident in 
free market forces.”9  With this in mind, it is important to first describe how 
the government regulates public utilities.  Then, it will be easier to see why 
there is a movement toward opening the electric utility industry to the benefits 
 
 8. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Tri-County Elec. Ass’n. v. City of Gillette, 525 P.2d 3, 9 
(Wyo. 1974)). 
 9. Laura R. Starling, Comment, Don’t Be Shocked! Electric Utility Deregulation Can 
Benefit Low-Cost States, 74 TUL. L. REV. 1519, 1525 (2000). 
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of a free market economy and greater competition among industry 
participants.10 
The major sectors of the economy are composed of private and 
government businesses.  There is, however, another form of business that is a 
hybrid of these, upon which this Comment focuses: public utilities. 
Because a state may, under the police power, regulate a business affected with 
a public interest, and because the prime characteristic of a public utility is that 
of public use or service, a state may regulate and control a public utility to 
protect the public interests and to promote the health, comfort, safety, and 
welfare of the people.11 
Pursuant to the Federal Power Act,12 the United States possesses the right to 
regulate public utilities.13  The right of states to regulate private companies that 
affect the public is also a creation of legislature and was affirmed in Munn v. 
Illinois in 1876.14  Public utilities are subject to regulation and afforded 
financial safeguards because of the unique position they occupy in business.  
Because of the monopolistic characteristics of their business,15 and the simple 
 
 10. See id. 
 11. 64 AM. JUR. 2D Public Utilities § 15 (2005).  It is at the legislature’s discretion to decide 
what interests are to be promoted and what measures serve to promote these interests.  Id.  While 
the state can control the manner in which utilities conduct their business, they cannot control the 
manager of the utility.  Id.  “In the absence of a clear and lawful limitation, a regulated public 
utility has all the rights granted by, and the duties imposed by, general law.”  Id. § 13. 
 12. 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a–825r (2000). 
 13. E.g., id. § 824(a). 
  It is declared that the business of transmitting and selling electric energy for ultimate 
distribution to the public is affected with a public interest, and that Federal regulation of 
matters relating to generation to the extent provided in this subchapter and subchapter III 
of this chapter and of that part of such business which consists of the transmission of 
electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of such energy at wholesale in 
interstate commerce is necessary in the public interest, such Federal regulation, however, 
to extend only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the States. 
Id.  While this section limits federal power to those areas not subject to regulation by the states, it 
also applies “to the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and to the sale of 
electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce.”  Id. § 824(b). 
 14. 94 U.S. 113 (1876); see, e.g., OKLA. CONST. art. 9, § 18 (The Commission shall have the 
power and authority and be charged with the duty of supervising, regulating and controlling all 
transportation and transmission companies doing business in this State, in all matters relating to 
the performance of their public duties and their charges therefor . . . .”). 
 15. Joan G. Fickinger, Comment, Jurisdiction of State Regulatory Commissions Over Public 
Utility Holding Company Diversification, 15 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 87, 89 n.12 (1983) (citing C. 
WILCOX & W. SHEPHERD, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 334 (5th ed. 1975)).  Public 
utilities can be divided into two categories of competitiveness: “monopolies” (consisting of 
telephone, electric power, natural gas, and sewage companies) and “partially competitive” 
companies (consisting of railroads, pipelines, and cable providers).  Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2006] ATTACKS ON EXECUTIVES 633 
fact that electricity is different from deregulated businesses, policy favors 
preventing rather than promoting competition among public utilities.16 
“[A] natural monopoly is a situation where a single company tends to 
become the only supplier of a product or service over time because the nature 
of that product or service makes a single supplier more efficient than multiple, 
competing ones.”17  In other words, companies like public utilities take 
advantage of economies of scale and markets that are particularly expensive to 
enter.  These advantages are formed in the utility industry because “the average 
cost of providing electricity falls as output increases.”18  As a result, policy 
favors regulating these monopolies rather than subjecting them to potentially 
destructive competition.19 
Electric utilities are generally composed of three sectors: generation, 
transmission, and distribution.20  Historically, there have been vertically 
integrated utilities (generation, transmission, and distribution), generation and 
transmission (G&T) utilities, and distribution companies (usually small 
cooperatives and municipal utilities).21  Public utilities are privately owned, but 
are heavily regulated by state commissions and the FERC at the federal level.22  
The state and federal governments then define the limits of the commission’s 
powers through statutory law.23  In almost every state this power is restricted 
and only permits commissions to act when companies take actions that will 
affect rates.24  However, in states like Kansas, regulatory commissions are also 
 
 16. Spencer Weber Waller, Competition, Consumer Protection and Energy Deregulation: A 
Conference Introduction, 33 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 749, 754 (2002) (“Electricity is necessary for 
modern life.  It has few reasonably effective substitutes, and it has a substantially inelastic 
demand curve making consumers vulnerable to price increases in times of shortage or when faced 
with exercise of market power.”). 
 17. Ipedia, Internet Encyclopedia, http://www.ipedia.com/natural_monopoly.html (last 
visited Mar. 25, 2006). 
 18. Starling, supra note 9, at 1521.  “For example, . . . once the utility company has incurred 
the fixed cost of stringing thousands of miles of lines, it costs less and less to serve additional 
customers.”  Id. at 1521–22.  However, technological advances in the gas industry have allowed 
smaller gas-fired generating plants to produce energy more efficiently, and as a result, the 
monopolistic characteristics of the energy market have been eliminated to an extent.  Id. at 1523. 
 19. Ipedia, supra note 17.  Many groups have lobbied to be treated as natural monopolies to 
take advantage of stable prices, a reduced risk of competition, and a guaranteed return for 
shareholders.  Id. 
 20. Id. at 1521. 
 21. Id.  When all three functions are performed by a vertically integrated utility, the end 
product is traditionally sold as a single product to the consumer.  Id. 
 22. Waller, supra note 16, at 754. 
 23. See Note, “Management Invaded”—A Real or False Defense?, 5 STAN. L. REV. 110, 
111 (1952) [hereinafter Management Invaded]. 
 24. See, e.g., WYO. STAT. ANN. § 37-2-121 (1999) (empowering the commission to act 
when it determines a rate “to be inadequate or unremunerative, or to be unjust, or unreasonable, 
or unjustly discriminatory, or unduly preferential”). 
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generally charged with ensuring that the utility provides “efficient and 
sufficient service,” referring to both economic efficiency and reliability.25 
Because commissions’ power is delegated by the legislature, the 
commissions can only exercise the portion of police power that has been 
specifically delegated to them.26  Statutory grants, however, often result in 
general grants of power, which incite interpretation problems for courts.27  
Because of these interpretation issues, troubles often arise when commissions 
attempt to restrict the operations of public utilities beyond the specific statutory 
grants of power to commissions.  Beyond statutory limitations, commissions 
are also limited by constitutions.28  The Federal Constitution is generally the 
basis for a constitutional challenge, since state constitutions rarely enter the 
cases.29  Thus, commissions’ attempts to over-regulate public utilities are 
 
 25. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-101b (2002). 
Every electric public utility governed by this act shall be required to furnish reasonably 
efficient and sufficient services and facilities for the use of any and all products or services 
rendered, furnished, supplied or produced by such electric public utility, to establish just 
and reasonable rates, charges and exactions and to make just and reasonable rules, 
classifications and regulations.  Every unjust or unreasonably discriminatory or unduly 
preferential rule, regulation, classification, rate, charge or exaction is prohibited and is 
unlawful and void.  The commission shall have the power, after notice and hearing in 
accordance with the provisions of the Kansas administrative procedure act, to require all 
electric public utilities governed by this act to establish and maintain just and reasonable 
rates when the same are reasonably necessary in order to maintain reasonably sufficient 
and efficient service from such electric public utilities. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 26. Management Invaded, supra note 23, at 111. 
 27. Id. at 112–13. 
 28. Id. at 113. 
 29. Id.  California expressly makes the legislature superior to their constitution, while other 
states approach the problem instead through federal means.  Id.; see also CAL. CONST. art. 12, § 
5. 
The Legislature has plenary power, unlimited by the other provisions of this constitution 
but consistent with this article, to confer additional authority and jurisdiction upon the 
commission, to establish the manner and scope of review of commission action in a court 
of record, and to enable it to fix just compensation for utility property taken by eminent 
domain. 
Id.  In Kansas, for example, “The commission is given full power, authority and jurisdiction to 
supervise and control the electric public utilities, as defined in K.S.A. 66-101a, doing business in 
Kansas, and is empowered to do all things necessary and convenient for the exercise of such 
power, authority and jurisdiction.”  KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-101.  While there have been numerous 
challenges to state commission rulings, these challenges have almost uniformly turned on the 
commissions’ interpretations of their delegated authority, not the constitutionality of the 
commissions’ orders.  See, e.g., Jones v. Kan. Gas & Elec. Co., 565 P.2d 597 (Kan. 1977); Cent.  
Kan. Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 561 P.2d 779 (Kan. 1977); Sekan Elec. Coop. Ass’n v. 
State Corp. Comm’n, 609 P.2d 188 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980). 
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occasionally viewed as an unlawful taking of property without due process,30 
or as an unlawful taking due to a lack of just compensation.31  However, 
commerce clause and due process challenges are often applied non-uniformly 
and without clarity, and as a result, the Invasion of Management defense is 
most commonly confined to limitations intrinsic to the statutory grants 
themselves.32 
With these limitations in mind, “[t]he legal issue [becomes] whether or not 
the commission has power to make the order”; in other words, “whether the 
subject of the order is the business of management or of regulation.”33  
Therefore, whenever a commission restricts a decision that should have been 
properly left to management, courts label that intrusion an “Invasion of 
Management.”34  But the Invasion of Management defense is not just a way of 
classifying a statutory or constitutional violation; there are also limitations to 
the power of managerial regulation that has been assigned to commissions.35 
Statutory power, in the form of general grants to commissions, clearly 
refers to regulatory power over services and facilities in the area of “direct 
contact” between the consumer and the utility.36  It is in this area that the 
Invasion of Management rationale provides two limits on the power of 
commissions to regulate.  First, commissions have the power to decide what 
services or facilities are available to the public, but not how these services or 
facilities are to be provided.37  Second, a “convenience-necessity rule” has 
developed to limit commissions’ power to regulate even if they are regulating 
in the area of what services or facilities are to be offered.38  This is most 
commonly applied when a utility wishes to abandon services, and requires that 
the commission show public necessity to deny the utility permission to 
 
 30. Management Invaded, supra note 23, at 115 (citing Atl. Coast Line v. Corp. Comm’n, 
206 U.S. 1, 20 (1907)). 
 31. Id. (citing Del. L. & W. R.R. v. Town of Morristown, 276 U.S. 182 (1928)). 
 32. Id. at 114–16. 
 33. Id. at 111. 
 34. See id. 
 35. Management Invaded, supra note 23, at 117.  Courts often refer to limitations on 
regulation in excess of the constitutional limits provided in that state or by the Federal 
Constitution.  Id. at 118. 
 36. Id. at 118.  “Commission orders are uniformly upheld when the managerial decision 
‘invaded’ is clearly within the area of direct consumer-utility contact.”  Id. at 119.  For example, 
in Southern Pacific Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 260 P.2d 70, 73 (Cal. 1953), part 2 of the 
order by the commission was not challenged as an Invasion of Management as it dealt with 
facilities in direct contact with the consumer.  Part 2 ordered “[t]hat other trains of [Southern 
Pacific Company] (‘The Senator’ and ‘The El Dorado’) be ‘refurbished to a standard comparable 
to modern, railway passenger equipment.’”  Id. at 72. 
 37. Management Invaded, supra note 23, at 120. 
 38. Id. at 123. 
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abandon the service.39  Whenever a commission oversteps one of these limits 
on its power to regulate, the commission has “invaded management.”  Thus, 
courts do draw lines within the limits specifically granted in statutes, but where 
this line is drawn between commissions and management is not always clear.40  
Over time, trends in the case law have been anything but consistent, and based 
on recent FERC decisions, commentators have recognized that “a clear trend is 
emerging toward heightened scrutiny of financial transactions involving public 
utilities and their nonutility parents and affiliates.”41  As a result, the Invasion 
of Management defense will often be implicated in situations involving 
affiliates of electric companies.  The effects of this situation will be explored in 
depth in the Westar case outlined in this Comment. 
II.  OPINIONS SHAPING THE INVASION OF MANAGEMENT DEFENSE 
A. Developing the Prongs of the Defense 
As early as 1923, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized that 
certain areas of a public utility’s business were reserved for management.  In 
Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service 
Commission, the Public Service Commission of Missouri (the “Missouri 
Commission”) directed Southwestern Bell Telephone Company (SBC) to 
reduce its service rates and to eliminate its charges for installation and moving 
expenses.42  SBC produced evidence as to the valuation of its property to show 
the Missouri Commission that its charges were warranted.43  Independent 
valuations also revealed that the Missouri Commission’s valuations were 
substantially lower than actual market value.44  As a result, the United States 
Supreme Court overruled an earlier judgment for the Missouri Commission 
and held that it was not warranted in disallowing an installation charge because 
management had the right to exercise its discretion.45 
The Court explained that “[i]t must never be forgotten that, while the state 
may regulate with a view to enforcing reasonable rates and charges, it is not 
the owner of the property of public utility companies, and is not clothed with 
the general power of management incident to ownership.”46  The Court went 
on to emphasize that “the [Missouri Commission] is not the financial manager 
 
 39. Id. 
 40. See id. at 117. 
 41. Teresa B. Salamone et al., Increased FERC Scrutiny of Financing Activities by Public 
Utilities, 18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Summer 2003, at 28, 31. 
 42. 262 U.S. 276, 282 (1923). 
 43. Id. 
 44. See id. at 288. 
 45. Id. at 288–89. 
 46. Id. at 289. 
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of the corporation, and it is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that 
of the directors of the corporation . . . .”47 
Even though the Missouri Commission was regulating rates in Missouri ex 
rel. Southwestern Bell, the Supreme Court found that there were limits on its 
power beyond those specifically provided in statutes.  Furthermore, while this 
decision was not cast in Invasion of Management language, it would serve as a 
building block for future utilities arguing that their managerial autonomy had 
been invaded.  Since this decision, actions by commissions have strayed well 
beyond simply regulating rates, and have thus evoked greater concern that they 
are beyond a public utility commission’s prescribed powers. 
After the Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell decision, more than twenty-
five years passed without any significant decisions in this area.  Although 
decisions were handed down restricting commission power, there were no 
egregious intrusions on management’s power.  But then, in 1950, the Supreme 
Court of California set the standard for what is now referred to as the Invasion 
of Management rationale in its Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Public 
Utilities Commission48 decision. 
In Pacific Telephone, two orders by the Public Utilities Commission of the 
State of California (the “California Commission”) were challenged as usurping 
the functions of internal management.49  American Telephone and Telegraph 
Company (AT&T) owned almost ninety percent of Pacific Telephone and 
Telegraph Company’s (PT&T) capital stock, and received one percent of 
PT&T’s gross receipts for its services regularly provided to PT&T.50  The 
California Commission viewed this as an exaction by a more powerful AT&T 
company and ordered that each transaction be viewed individually and that 
AT&T be paid only for specific services provided for that particular 
transaction.51  PT&T recognized that the California Commission could prevent 
payments that it viewed as excessive, but argued that the California 
Commission was without power to usurp management’s role by prescribing 
contract terms for them.52  At the time, California had not expressly granted the 
California Commission the power to regulate payments between an operating 
utility and its affiliated parent company, so the court looked to determine if any 
 
 47. 263 U.S. at 289 (quoting States Pub. Utils. Comm’n ex rel. Springfield v. Springfield 
Gas & Elec. Co., 125 N.E. 891, 901 (1920)). 
 48. 215 P.2d 441 (Cal. 1950). 
 49. Id. at 442. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.  Specifically, the order required that only reasonable costs be paid to AT&T, 
determined by what it would actually cost AT&T within its own organization.  Id.  Furthermore, 
PT&T was required to file bimonthly reports explaining any transactions with AT&T and to 
avoid exceeding a $2,250,000 annual basis without approval from the California Commission.  
Id. at 442–43. 
 52. Id. at 443. 
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statutes currently granting the California Commission power would allow this 
order.53 
The Public Utilities Act of California served two broad purposes: (1) it 
allowed the California Commission to regulate the service and rates between 
the consumer and the utility, and (2) it required commission approval of either 
the sale or encumbrance of property and the issuance of new securities.54  
However, the court pointed out that the Act did not provide the California 
Commission with the “power to regulate the contracts by which the utility 
secures the labor, materials, and services necessary for the conduct of its 
business, whether such contracts are made with affiliated corporations or 
others.”55  The California Commission was not permitted to regulate areas that 
were not impressed with direct contact between the utility and the consumer, 
such as affiliate contract terms.56 
The court began by recognizing that almost every contract a public utility 
enters into will affect its rates in one way or another.57  However, the court 
went on to emphasize that “[t]he determination of what is reasonable in 
conducting the business of the utility is the primary responsibility of 
management.”58  Furthermore, the court found that if the California 
Commission is able to substitute its judgment for that of management in 
contract making and the general business of utilities, then it is able to assume 
management of all utilities in its jurisdiction.59  The court noted that even if 
management were derelict in its duties, the law does not justify taking away 
control of the company or vesting ownership with the public simply because 
the company is a regulated “public” utility.60 
The court then went through a brief history of instances where courts 
prevented commission intervention, explaining that other courts using statutes 
similar to those in California only allow contract modification where the 
contract impacts rates and services directly.61  Although precedent in the area 
 
 53. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 215 P.2d at 443–44.  At this time, many state legislatures had 
enacted statutes to protect consumers from potential abuses that could occur between a utility and 
its parent company.  See Legislation, 49 HARV. L. REV. 957, 982–89 (1936) (analyzing states’ 
regulation of service contracts). 
 54. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 215 P.2d at 444. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 445. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 215 P.2d at 445. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id.  The court noted that previously, in Hollywood Chamber of Commerce v. Railroad 
Commission, the court held that the Railroad Commission could not require the Hollywood 
Chamber of Commerce to discontinue paying dividends to expand into profitable fields that the 
utility was not currently involved in, since it was properly management’s choice.  Id. (citing 219 
P. 983 (Cal. 1923)).  Along the same lines, the court cited Southern Pacific Co. v. Railroad 
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was not strong yet, the court elected to emphasize the need for direct contact 
between the utility and the consumer in order for a commission to permissibly 
intervene in management’s decisions.62 
Therefore, with the limited precedent before it, the court reiterated that the 
contract between PT&T and AT&T was not hampering the plaintiff’s service 
to the public.63  The court explained that the situation was no different than any 
other where management disagrees with a commission on the profitability of 
an expenditure, but decides to go forward with the expenditure, even though it 
cannot recover the costs from ratepayers should it prove unprofitable.64  Based 
on this reasoning, the court effectively outlined the first part of the Invasion of 
Management rationale: In order to regulate, a commission must be dealing 
with an area impressed with direct utility–consumer contact.  Future litigation 
between commissions and public utility companies would invoke Pacific 
Telephone’s framework in part or in whole for many years to come.65 
The next several years provided few “landmark” decisions, yet these 
decisions were important in further developing a framework for analyzing 
problems between commissions and public utility companies.  Three years 
after Pacific Telephone, the Supreme Court of California issued an opinion that 
commissions would cling to for a number of years.  In Southern Pacific Co. v. 
Public Utilities Commission,66 the court affirmed the Public Utilities 
Commission’s order directing Southern Pacific Company to substitute modern 
railway passenger cars for its outdated steam locomotives.67  The court did not 
make a single mention of Pacific Telephone, but responded to the Invasion of 
Management argument by stating that the language of sections 730, 761, 762, 
and 763 of the California Public Utilities Code specifically authorized the 
commission’s order.68  Although commissions interpreted this opinion as 
 
Commission, which found that there is a “zone of reasonableness” within which management is 
allowed to prescribe its own rates.  Id. (citing 87 P.2d 1055, 1070 (Cal. 1939)).  The court noted 
that other courts using statutes similar to those in California allowed contract modification only 
where the contract impacted rates and services directly.  Id. 
 62. See id. at 445–46. 
 63. Id. at 447. 
 64. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 215 P.2d at 447. 
 65. See, e.g., Gay Law Students Ass’n v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 595 P.2d 592, 604 n.11 (Cal. 
1979); Credit Ins. Gen. Agents Ass’n v. Payne, 547 P.2d 993, 997–98 (Cal. 1976); Stepak v. Am. 
Tel. and Tel. Co., 231 Cal Rptr. 37, 40–43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987); Gen. Tel. Co. v. Lundy, 218 
N.E.2d 274, 277 (N.Y. 1966).  Even though Pacific Telephone has been criticized in recent years, 
it has withstood judicial scrutiny to the present day. 
 66. 260 P.2d 70 (Cal. 1953) (en banc). 
 67. Id. at 72, 79. 
 68. Id. at 78. 
[The Sections] empower the commission to “determine the kind and character of facilities 
and the extent of the operation thereof, necessary reasonably and adequately to meet 
public requirements for services furnished by common carriers.”  By Section 761 it is 
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broadening their general grants of statutory power, the opinion actually only 
reinforced the principles inherent in the Invasion of Management rationale.  In 
other words, management is prohibited from complaining when a commission 
prescribes what services or facilities a utility can provide and acts in 
accordance with specific statutory grants. 
Several years after this opinion, other courts began to build on the Pacific 
Telephone and Southern Pacific Co. opinions and recognize that commissions 
could not prescribe how services were to be provided even in areas of direct 
consumer contact.  In Rhode Island Consumers’ Council v. Smith,69 the Rhode 
Island Public Utilities Commission directed a utility to include a one-dollar per 
month discount for senior citizens (65 years or older) in any new tariff that the 
utility added to its rates.70  The court noted that while management is allowed 
to classify a gift as an operating expense in certain situations, courts have 
never authorized public utility commissions to “invade management’s province 
by directing a utility to make a charitable contribution.”71  Thus, the Supreme 
Court of Rhode Island found that commissions could not regulate rates that 
were lawfully established.72  As the courts had already determined in Southern 
Pacific Co., commissions are only permitted to regulate what services and 
facilities a utility provides to its consumers, not how the services are provided. 
The cases that followed Smith in the next nineteen years added little to 
Invasion of Management jurisprudence.  However, in 1984, courts around the 
country again began to embark on decisions cast in this language.  The modern 
Invasion of Management jurisprudence has expanded commissions’ power 
somewhat as courts are erring on the side of over-regulation.  Even so, courts 
have not provided commissions with unbridled control over the operations of a 
utility.  A 1984 decision from the Supreme Court of Wyoming made it clear 
that courts concentrate on one more issue in determining whether a 
commission has invaded management’s prerogative. 
In Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Public Service Commission,73 the Public 
Service Commission of Wyoming (the “Wyoming Commission”) determined 
that losses in a nuclear power construction project should be borne by the 
stockholders of Pacific Power & Light Company (PP&L) and not by the 
 
provided that whenever the commission, after a hearing finds that the equipment of the 
utility is inadequate it shall determine and by order require the proper equipment to be 
employed.  Section 762 contains language to similar effect.  And Section 763 authorizes 
the commission, upon hearing and findings, to require adequate train services as to time 
schedules, equipment and transportation facilities. 
Id. (internal citation omitted). 
 69. 302 A.2d 757 (R.I. 1973). 
 70. Id. at 775. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. 677 P.2d 799 (Wyo. 1984). 
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consumers.74  The court explained that the decision to undertake the project 
was that of management and the representatives of PP&L after calculating the 
risk and possible return.75  Moreover, there would be no risk at all to PP&L if 
the consumers were to bear the loss, and PP&L would thus undertake projects 
that had even a very small chance of success.76  The majority reasoned, 
therefore, that consumers could not bear the risk of a faulty project unless 
PP&L obtained approval from the Wyoming Commission prior to undertaking 
the project.77  The Supreme Court made it clear that this decision was justified 
because there was a public necessity to prevent the utility from imposing the 
costs of an unsuccessful project on the public.78  Thus, the Supreme Court of 
Wyoming established the final prong of the Invasion of Management defense: 
a commission wishing to prevent utility action (here, imposing the costs of a 
failed project) must show a public necessity, rather than public convenience, to 
deny the utility permission to perform the action. 
B. Modern Decisions Defining the Limits of the Invasion of Management 
Defense 
Two years after the final prong of the Invasion of Management defense 
was established in Pacific Power and Light Co., the California courts returned 
to their jurisprudence in this area and restricted a decision they had handed 
 
 74. Id. at 806. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. at 808–09.  But see id. at 809–11 (Rose, J., specially concurring) (explaining that 
permitting the utility to recover its investments in terminated projects if the proposal was first 
submitted to the commission would exceed the scope of the statute). 
 78. Pac. Power & Light Co., 677 P.2d at 808–09.  At about the same time, a similar decision 
was handed down in Pennsylvania.  In Duquesne Light Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility 
Commission, the court again sided with a commission, but reiterated the most important boundary 
regulating decisions in this area.  507 A.2d 1274 (Pa. 1986).  The court cited the Pennsylvania 
Public Utility Code, stating that “[i]t is a fundamental principle of public utility law that a utility 
may not recover costs from its ratepayers unless such costs have been determined to be just and 
reasonable.”  Id. at 1278.  However, the court stated that while the Pennsylvania Public Utility 
Commission (the “Pennsylvania Commission”) had power to regulate utilities when their conduct 
affected the public, the Commission’s power to insert itself into the role of management was 
restricted, unless there existed a public necessity.  Id.  With the Code’s language in mind, the 
Court found that the Pennsylvania Commission could establish a mine price cap formula for 
determining market price, because the costs of coal were being directly passed on to the 
consumers.  Id. at 1279–81.  The coal mine that Duquesne Light Company (“Duquesne”) had 
developed some years back was producing coal at cost higher than local prices.  See id. at 1281. 
While the Pennsylvania Commission allowed the recovery of some deferred costs, it did not 
permit full recovery since Duquesne’s management chose to undertake the project.  Id.  
Consequently, the court seemed to proffer a basic rule: commissions can only regulate in an area 
that protects consumer interests when there is a possibility of increased rates.  See id. at 1278. 
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down only three years earlier.79  In Stepak v. American Telephone and 
Telgraph Co.,80 AT&T owned over ninety percent of the voting shares of 
PT&T, while Stepak (an individual shareholder) owned some of the remaining 
shares.81  In 1981, PT&T applied with the Public Utility Commission (PUC) to 
merge with a subsidiary of AT&T and eliminate all minority voting power in 
PT&T.82  The PUC approved the merger, and as a result, AT&T gained 
complete voting control in the merged companies.83  In the process, the PUC 
likened the minority shareholders to ratepayers, but found that their interests 
would not be adversely affected because they were receiving a fair price for 
their shares.84 
On appeal to the California Court of Appeal, First District, Stepak first 
challenged the jurisdiction of the PUC to adjudicate issues regarding minority 
shareholders.85  Likening the current case to Pacific Telephone, the court found 
no power, granted or implied, that allowed the PUC to decide whether the 
merger was fair to minority shareholders, and it concluded that the PUC did 
not have jurisdiction to make this determination and that the minority 
shareholders had a legitimate claim.86 
The California Supreme Court, in General Telephone Co. v. Public 
Utilities Commission,87 then discussed the recent language limiting the 
Invasion of Management rationale.88  There the court explained that the Pacific 
Telephone decision and the Invasion of Management rationale had been cast 
into doubt, noting the decisions in Southern Pacific Co. v. Public Utilities 
Commission89 and Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Railroad Commission90 as 
support for this proposition.91  Therefore, the California Supreme Court, 
drawing support from various Public Utilities Code provisions, rejected 
 
 79. As more recent decisions have indicated (as discussed infra in this section), California 
has developed this area of law more than any other state, and this decision would once again 
instill life into proponents of the “management invaded” defense. 
 80. 231 Cal. Rptr. 37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986). 
 81. Id. at 38. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 39. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Stepak, 231 Cal. Rptr. at 40. 
 86. Id. at 40–42. 
 87. 670 P.2d 349 (Cal. 1983). 
 88. Id. at 352–56. 
 89. 260 P.2d 70 (Cal. 1953) (en banc) (discussed supra in text accompanying notes 66–68). 
 90. 288 P. 775, 779 (Cal. 1930) (holding that the commission’s order requiring the 
construction of a new terminal was supported by numerous statutory provisions). 
 91. Gen. Tel. Co., 670 P.2d at 353–54.  However, the court was quick to note that “Atchison 
and Southern Pacific can, of course, be distinguished from Pac. Tel. in that they deal directly with 
the commission’s power over service,” emphasizing that it still considered the defense to be 
disfavored.  Id. at 354 n.10. 
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General Telephone Company’s argument.92  The court explained that unlike 
Pacific Telephone, the commission in General Telephone Co. was only trying 
to provide better service and thus regulate the direct “relationship of the utility 
to the consumer.”93 
With this precedent in mind, the Stepak court opined that “the ‘invasion of 
management rationale,’ while near terminal ‘in the area of “direct consumer-
utility contact,”’ has life in areas other than direct consumer-utility contact.”94  
Because Stepak’s actions had no effect on rates or services in this case,95 the 
Invasion of Management rationale applied to limit the PUC’s power in areas 
without direct contact between consumers and the utility.96  Thus, while it was 
clear that commissions could regulate areas impressed with direct consumer–
utility contact, it was uncertain whether courts would speak of the how/why 
distinction and public necessity/convenience prongs of the defense in the 
future. 
Less than one year later, a Wyoming Court would be the first to recognize 
that the Invasion of Management rationale had not deteriorated, setting the 
stage for a continued revival of the defense over the next several years. 
In the case of In re Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co.,97 the 
Wyoming Commission ordered Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph 
Company (MST&T) to rescind a recent transfer of its directory publishing 
division to its sister corporation and instead submit its directory publication to 
competitive bidding.98  The court, however, held that there was not a sufficient 
“connection between the revenue produced by the directory publishing service 
and the rates that [MST&T] ultimately charged for those services which are 
furnished ‘to or for the public’” for the Wyoming Commission to exercise 
jurisdiction over MST&T’s business transaction.99 
In reaching its decision the court reiterated its own language just three 
years earlier in Pacific Power and Light: “[A commission] is not in a position 
to take on any aspect of utility management.  It must restrict its position to 
 
 92. The court noted that sections 701, 728, and 761 of the California Public Utility Code 
were “ample to sustain the challenged order.”  Id. at 356. 
 93. Id. at 353.  Consequently, while the court noted that the Invasion of Management 
defense had been cast into doubt, it still based its decision within the parameters of the defense.  
See id. at 353–55. 
 94. Stepak v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co., 231 Cal. Rptr. 37, 43 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1987) (quoting Gen. Tel. Co., 670 P.2d at 356) (internal citations omitted). 
 95. According to the court, “[The PUC] in this case expressly concluded that . . . the merger 
would not have any direct effect on the terms, conditions or cost of service provided to California 
ratepayers,” since the PUC instituted an additional protective measure to offset ratemaking 
adjustments.  Id. at 43. 
 96. Id. 
 97. 745 P.2d 563 (Wyo. 1987). 
 98. Id. at 564. 
 99. Id. at 570. 
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‘regulation’ with management decisions being entirely that of the utility.”100  
While the court recognized the recent language in General Telephone, stating 
that “the ‘invasion of management’ rationale now appears to be disfavored,”101 
the court went on to conclude that “[t]his prognostication by the Supreme 
Court of California may not be entirely accurate.”102  Statutes give the 
Wyoming Commission its only power, the court continued, and in this instance 
the Wyoming Commission had no support for its actions.103  Furthermore, in 
this case the utility was acting as a private entity, and as such, the Wyoming 
Commission acted beyond its jurisdiction in ordering how MST&T was to 
outsource its directory-publishing division.104 
Modern proponents of deregulation and restricting commission 
interference rest much of their rationale on this decision.  The court rebuked 
language limiting the Invasion of Management defense that California courts 
had proffered a year earlier, and reopened the door for this defense to public 
utility companies across the United States.  The Invasion of Management 
defense again required that commissions only regulate areas impressed with 
direct consumer–utility contact, and even within this area, commissions could 
only regulate what services were to be provided. 
While recent decisions continue to reflect this rejuvenation of the defense, 
other courts continue to uphold commission decisions that involve direct 
contact between the consumers and the utility.  In Arizona Corp. Commission 
v. State ex rel. Woods,105 for example, the Attorney General of Arizona refused 
to certify three rules proposed by the Arizona Corporation Commission (the 
“Arizona Commission”) giving it governance over transactions between public 
utilities and their affiliates.106  The Arizona Commission’s proposed rules 
included (1) definitions, (2) reporting requirements, and (3) approval 
provisions.107  The latter two requirements were challenged by the Attorney 
 
 100. Id. at 568 (quoting 677 P.2d 799, 807 (Wyo. 1984)). 
 101. Id. at 569 (quoting 670 P.2d 349, 354 n.10 (Cal. 1983)). 
 102. In re Mountain States Tel. and Tel. Co., 745 P.2d at 569. 
 103. Id. at 571. 
 104. See id. at 569, 571. 
 105. 830 P.2d 807 (Ariz. 1992) (en banc). 
 106. Id. at 808. 
 107. Id. at 810. 
The [reporting requirements] require notice from any utility or affiliate intending to 
organize or reorganize a public utility holding company.  The notice must disclose 
specific information regarding the proposed holding companies: the officers and directors 
and their business purposes, various financial and organizational information, 
diversification plans, and anticipated changes in the utility’s costs and services.  The 
informational rules also permit the Commission to gain access to an affiliate’s books and 
records regarding its transactions with a public utility.  Finally, the rules require annual 
reports from utilities and their holding companies regarding diversification plans and 
business activities between affiliates and the utility. 
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General of Arizona on behalf of more than twenty different state utility 
companies.108 
The court began by looking at the historical background of the 
commission, finding that several ideological groups at the Arizona 
Constitutional Convention of 1910 “shared a strong distrust of corporate 
powers,” and joined forces to promote a strong commission.109  The Arizona 
Constitution also seemed to give more extensive power to the Arizona 
Commission than the Virginia and Oklahoma constitutions, even though 
Arizona’s constitution was patterned after these states’ constitutions.110  The 
court then looked to precedent in this area and concluded “that the 
Commission has no regulatory authority under [the constitution] except that 
connected to its ratemaking power,” but that deference must be afforded to the 
Commission to determine which regulations are necessary to protect rates.111  
The Court ultimately found that the Arizona Commission must be given the 
power to prevent transactions in advance in order to protect ratepayers from 
potential losses.112 
In a similar decision, the Supreme Court of New Mexico supported a 
commission’s decision preventing a utility from implementing tariffs to fund 
“optional service” programs.113The optional service programs would have 
allowed the utility to provide to its customers utility-related services that were 
not part of the utility’s essential gas or utility business.114  The court 
recognized that while a commission’s regulation of public utilities is limited, it 
 
  The approval rules require utilities to obtain Commission approval of the 
organization or reorganization of utility holding companies.  These rules also require 
Commission approval of transactions by which utility corporations acquire or assume any 
financial interest in, or liabilities of, certain affiliates, lend to those affiliates, or use utility 
funds to form a subsidiary. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 811–12.  “As one influential framer, Michael Cunniff, argued, ‘in almost every 
state . . . corporations have altogether too much influence in the [state’s] direction and control.’”  
Id. at 812 (quoting JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF ARIZONA 435 (Cronin 
comp. 1925), quoted in John D. Leshy, The Making of the Arizona Constitution, 20 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1, 89–90 (1988)). 
 110. Ariz. Corp. Comm’n, 830 P.2d at 812. 
 111. Id. at 815.  “While diversification may be a wise financial decision for utility companies 
in some or even most instances, many critics ‘fear that financial improvement through 
unregulated diversification will come at the expense of utility ratepayers.’”  Id. at 817 (quoting 
Fickinger, supra note 15, at 95). 
 112. Id. at 818. 
 113. In re Application of PNM Elec. Servs., A Div. of Pub. Servs. Co. of New Mexico v. 
New Mexico Pub. Util. Comm’n, 961 P.2d 147, 152 (N.M. 1998). 
 114. Id. at 148–49. 
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was permissible in this case because substantial evidence showed that the 
program would pose risks to rates.115 
In re Application PNM Electric Services seems to permit a commission to 
regulate an area not involved with direct contact between the consumer and the 
utility.  Therefore, this opinion has been cited in numerous cases and 
secondary sources to support commission intervention.116  In reality, however, 
Arizona now adheres to a broader construction of commission power than 
other jurisdictions, making it unlikely that an invasion of management 
argument would prove successful Arizona.117 
Other states, however, still adhere to the framework intrinsic to invasion of 
management principles.  For example, in Public Service Co. v. State ex rel. 
Corp. Commission,118 the Oklahoma Corporation Commission (OCC) filed a 
rule change to close what they viewed as a “loophole” in Rule 60, which 
allowed some electric consumers to switch suppliers without cost.119  To 
prevent the loophole, the OCC changed the word “consumer” to “electric 
consuming facility.”120  With this change, people who could once move into a 
new apartment and choose an electric supplier without cost were now required 
to either maintain the previous renter’s electric provider or pay the changeover 
cost.121  The Public Service Company of Oklahoma (PSC of Oklahoma) urged 
that this requirement should be eliminated because the costs of switching are 
often prohibitive to the consumer, and thus, did not allow consumers to choose 
their electric provider.122 
The PSC of Oklahoma further argued that this constituted interference with 
internal management decisions, and as such, was not permitted by the 
 
 115. Id. at 153. 
 116. See, e.g., State ex rel. Sandel v. N.M. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 980 P.2d 55, 60 (N.M. 1999); 
Martinez v. N.M. State Eng’r Office, 9 P.3d 657, 662 (N.M. Ct. App. 2000); 73 C.J.S. Public 
Administrative Law and Procedure § 106–07 (2004); Judy Sheldrew, Shutting the Barn Door 
Before the Horse Is Stolen: How and Why State Public Utility Commissions Should Regulate 
Transactions Between a Public Utility and Its Affiliates, 4 NEV. L.J. 164, 170 (2003). 
 117. See, e.g., In re Application of PNM Elec. Servs., 961 P.2d at 151–52. 
 118. 918 P.2d 733 (Okla. 1996). 
 119. Id. at 734, 736. 
Rule 60 provides the procedure which must be utilized by a consumer, having available two or 
more electric suppliers, to switch from one supplier to another.  In the event of such a switch by 
the consumer, the rule requires that the costs be paid to the replaced supplier by the acquiring 
supplier.  The acquiring supplier is then forced, by Rule 60, to pass on the costs of the switch to 
the consumer. 
Id. at 734. 
 120. Id. at 736. 
 121. See id. 
 122. Id. at 736, 738. 
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Oklahoma Constitution.123  While the PSC of Oklahoma agreed that the OCC 
could protect the public’s interest when regulating rates, it disagreed with the 
OCC’s proposed interference into how the PSC of Oklahoma established new 
service.124 
To resolve the issue, the court looked to prior authority, first citing 
Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Corp. Commission125 for its language 
constraining the authority of a commission: “[A commission] may regulate 
functions of corporations falling within its jurisdiction, only if the activity is 
impressed with public interest.”126  In other words, there must be direct contact 
between the consumer and the utility. 
Next, the Public Service court considered Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. 
Corp. Commission,127 where the Oklahoma Supreme Court rejected the OCC’s 
attempt to disallow the construction of a new generation station.128  The court 
stated “the Constitution does not clothe [the OCC] with the general power of 
internal management and control incident to ownership,” nor does it confer 
“either expressly or by necessary implication, the power to regulate, supervise 
and control the internal management and control of a public utility.”129  In 
effect, the court in Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. found that there was no 
public necessity that would permit the OCC to intervene. 
 
 123. Pub. Serv. Co., 918 P.2d at 738.  The court noted that the Oklahoma Constitution at 
Article 9, section 18, includes precise limitations on the OCC’s authority directly bearing on the 
case at bar: 
The [OCC] shall have the power and authority and be charged with the duty of 
supervising, regulating and controlling all transportation and transmission companies 
doing business in this state, in all matters relating to the performance of their public duties 
and their charges therefor . . . and to that end the [OCC] shall, from time to time, prescribe 
and enforce against such companies, in the manner hereinafter authorized, such rates, 
charges, classifications of traffic, and rules and regulations, and shall require them to 
establish and maintain all such public services, facilities, and conveniences as may be 
reasonable and just . . . . 
Id. 
 124. Id. at 739. 
 125. 672 P.2d 44 (Okla. 1983). 
 126. Pub. Serv. Co., 918 P.2d at 739 (quoting Mo. Pac. R.R. Co., 672 P.2d at 44).  In Missouri 
Pacific Railroad Co., the court held that a commission’s order requiring railroads to provide 
lockers to their employees was not within the commission’s authority.  672 P.2d at 45. 
 127. 543 P.2d 546 (Okla. 1975). 
 128. Pub. Serv. Co., 918 P.2d at 739 (citing Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 543 P.2d at 551). 
 129. Id. (quoting Okla. Gas & Elec. Co., 543 P.2d at 551–52).  The court in Oklahoma Gas & 
Electric Co. concluded by quoting Lone Star Gas Co. v. Corp. Commission: 
The powers of the Commission are to regulate, supervise, and control the public service 
companies in their services and rates, but these powers do not extend to an invasion of the 
discretion vested in the corporate management.  It does not include the power to approve 
or disapprove contracts about to be entered into, nor to the approval or veto of 
expenditures proposed. 
Id. (quoting 39 P.2d 547, 552 (Okla. 1934)). 
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With this precedent in mind, the court turned to the instant case and 
explained that the OCC’s order requiring consumers to bear changeover costs 
is impressed with direct contact between the consumer and the utility, but is 
contrary to precedent in that area because it dictates how new service will be 
established.130  The court rationalized its decisions, stating that if a commission 
is concerned that switching costs borne by the utility will result in general rate 
increases, a commission should simply refuse the rate increase when the utility 
proposes it.131  Consequently, as recently as 1996, the Supreme Court of 
Oklahoma has issued an opinion cast in the Invasion of Management rationale.  
As is often the case, however, this court did not explicitly call the commission 
order they overturned an “Invasion of Management,” even though it adhered to 
the same rationale. 
Thus, while the Invasion of Management defense continues to live on in 
most states, important questions continue to linger around the label itself.  
Whether the label will continue to be used is a question for future courts.  
However, this framework would have provided a more efficient way for the 
court to analyze the FERC’s order in the Westar decision.  For that matter, the 
Invasion of Management defense could prove to be a more efficient analysis 
for all courts who encounter similar issues of questionable regulation by public 
utility commissions. 
III.  WESTAR ENERGY’S PROPOSED BOND ISSUANCE 
The FERC, in its recent Westar decision, imposed four new restrictions on 
any public utility’s issuance of debt (secured or unsecured), and explicitly 
stated that “it is the Commission’s intention that these restrictions will be 
applied to all future public utility issuances of secured and unsecured 
debt . . . .”132  The FERC went on to “remind public utilities that section 204 
[of the Federal Power Act (FPA)] gives the FERC Commission the authority to 
issue supplemental orders, and modify the provisions of any previous 
order . . . .”133  The depths of this decision and its future implications encroach 
on areas of management formerly inaccessible to commission power.  Before 
discussing the implications of this decision, however, one must understand the 
background against which it was decided. 
A. Background 
In September of 2002, Westar applied for authorization to issue long-term, 
unsecured debt in the amount of $650 million, in compliance with section 
 
 130. See id. at 740. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Westar Energy, Inc., 102 F.E.R.C. 61186, 61512 (2003), 2003 WL 732901. 
 133. Id. at 61512–13. 
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204(a) of the FPA.134  Westar, pursuant to the FERC’s request for additional 
financial information, filed details relating to its current debt load, future debt 
requirements, and reasons why the proposed issuances were in the public’s 
best interest.135  The Kansas Corporation Commission (KCC) and MBIA 
Insurance Company (MBIA) then filed motions to intervene in the FERC’s 
proceedings.136 
The KCC expressed concerns about Westar’s financial situation, namely 
its capital structure and debt obligations.137  Although the KCC made clear that 
it did not oppose Westar’s potential debt issuance, it did emphasize that the 
issuance must be unsecured for the KCC’s approval to remain intact.138  
MBIA, on the other hand, insured the bulk of Westar’s bonds secured by the 
mortgage pledge of Westar and Kansas Gas and Electric Company (KG&E), a 
subsidiary of Westar.139  MBIA stated that it had “become alarmed at . . . 
recent indications regarding troubling financial and management issues with 
Westar.”140  MBIA went on to recommend that the FERC exercise caution and 
 
 134. Id. at 61510.  The FPA section 204(a) is codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824c(a) and provides: 
  No public utility shall issue any security, or assume any obligation or liability as 
guarantor, indorser, surety, or otherwise in respect of any security of another person, 
unless and until, and then only to the extent that, upon application by the public utility, the 
Commission by order authorizes such issue or assumption of liability.  The Commission 
shall make such order only if it finds that such issue or assumption (a) is for some lawful 
object, within the corporate purposes of the applicant and compatible with the public 
interest, which is necessary or appropriate for or consistent with the proper performance 
by the applicant of service as a public utility and which will not impair its ability to 
perform that service, and (b) is reasonably necessary or appropriate for such purposes.  
The provisions of this section shall be effective six months after August 26, 1935. 
16 U.S.C. § 824c(a) (2000). 
 135. Westar Energy, Inc., 102 F.E.R.C. at 61510. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id.  There was an undertow at this time that Westar was mismanaged and swimming in 
debt due in large part to its unprofitable investment in unregulated subsidiaries such as Protection 
One.  John Hanna, Westar to Sell Non-utility Assets, TULSA WORLD, Feb. 7, 2003, at E6 (“Critics 
have said Westar’s investment in Protection One drained the company’s finances, though Westar 
executives have maintained Protection One’s management improved over the past two years, 
creating operating cash.”).  These concerns likely stemmed from a view that regulated utility 
customers were being forced to pay the higher cost of utility-secured debt associated with non-
utility Westar affiliates.  See id. 
 138. Westar Energy, Inc., 102 F.E.R.C. at 61510. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id.  In its motion to intervene, MBIA went on to outline recent events that had created 
concern regarding Westar’s financial strength.  Motion to Intervene of MBIA Insurance 
Corporation at 3, Westar Energy, Inc., 102 F.E.R.C. 61186 (2003) (No. ES02-51-000).  First, 
MBIA was concerned over the KCC’s recent order requiring Westar to restructure its operations 
to protect ratepayers.  Id.  Next, several grand jury investigations into executive activities brought 
MBIA some anxiety.  Id.  Finally, MBIA was apprehensive of Westar’s attempts to restructure in 
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seek out all appropriate information in considering Westar’s proposal.141  Thus, 
this notice of intervention served as the first sign that Westar’s past managerial 
decisions were under consideration.  Both the KCC and MBIA recommended 
intervention into the “troubling” management of Westar, evoking great 
concern from the FERC in a time shortly after the disasters associated with the 
Enron and WorldCom collapses. 
The KCC then established additional requirements for Westar by filing two 
motions to lodge its orders with the FERC, detailing financial and corporate 
restructuring obligations.142  The FERC did not allow Westar to answer the 
KCC’s or MBIA’s motions for intervention because good cause was not 
shown.143  However, Westar did respond to the KCC’s complaints, explaining 
that its proposed refinancing was in response to current debt that matured in 
the near future, and that “without the ability to refinance Westar could 
potentially face a liquidity crisis.”144 
B. The FERC’s Decision 
Section 204 of the FPA requires utilities to obtain permission from the 
FERC before issuing or assuming any securities.145  Furthermore, before the 
FERC will approve the request, a utility must establish a lawful purpose and 
some necessity for the issuance.146  Although the FERC concluded that Westar 
met these statutory requirements,147 the FERC conditioned Westar’s request on 
a few additional stipulations.148  First, the new debt must only be used to retire 
outstanding indebtedness, and second, quarterly status reports of its corporate 
condition must be filed with the FERC.149 
The FERC then established new restrictions, explaining that it would 
“impose four additional restrictions and it is the Commission’s intention that 
 
the face of opposition by the KCC and the restrictions imposed by the Investment Company Act 
of 1940.  Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Westar Energy, Inc., 102 F.E.R.C. at 61510.  Westar was required to provide monthly 
reports on Westar’s debt situation; reduce secured utility debt by $100 million per year; gain the 
KCC’s approval before Westar issued any new debt; separate utility subsidiaries from non-utility 
subsidiaries; and minimize unfavored accounting problems among Westar’s affiliates.  Id. 
 143. Id. at 61510–11. 
 144. Id. at 61511. 
 145. 16 U.S.C. § 824c(a) (2000). 
 146. Id. 
 147. Westar Energy, Inc., 102 F.E.R.C. at 61511 (explaining that “the proposed issuance of 
long-term, unsecured debt is for a lawful object within Westar’s corporate purposes and is 
necessary, appropriate and consistent with Westar’s performance as a public utility”). 
 148. Id. at 61512. 
 149. Id.  FERC imposed one additional condition, stating that “Westar must file a Report of 
Securities Issued within 30 days after the sale or placement of the long-term, unsecured debt, as 
stated in the Commission’s regulations.”  Id. 
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these restrictions will be applied to all future public utility issuances of 
secured and unsecured debt authorized by this Commission.”150  These four 
restrictions, outlined below, proved to be the most controversial, and have 
sparked concerns about the FERC’s authority in this area.151 
First, public utilities seeking authorization to issue debt that is secured (i.e., 
backed) by utility assets must use the proceeds of the debt for utility purposes 
only.  Second, with respect to such utility asset-secured debt issuances, if any 
utility assets that secure such debt issuances are divested or “spun off,” the 
debt must “follow” the asset and be divested or “spun off” as well. 
  Third, if assets financed with unsecured debt are divested or “spun off,” 
the associated unsecured debt must follow those assets.  Specifically, if any of 
the proceeds from unsecured debt are used for non-utility purposes, the debt 
likewise must “follow” the non-utility assets and if the non-utility assets are 
divested or “spun off” then a proportionate share of debt must “follow” the 
associated non-utility assets by being divested or “spun off” as well.  Last, 
with respect to unsecured debt used for utility purposes, if utility assets 
financed by unsecured debt are divested or “spun off” to another entity, then a 
proportionate share of the debt also must be divested or “spun off”.152 
The FERC noted that because of these additional requirements, future 
public utilities will be prevented from borrowing to finance non-utility 
businesses, and will thus act more in the public’s best interests.153  And with 
that simple edict, the FERC added requirements that no other public utility 
before Westar had been forced to comply with.  Although the FPA allowed the 
FERC to condition approval of a debt issuance on a showing of lawful purpose 
and necessity, there was no authority cited for the FERC’s additional four 
requirements.154  Because of this absence of authority, current concerns have 
driven cries of over-regulation and apprehension over what other areas of 
management the FERC will soon attempt to control. 
Since the Westar Order, the FERC has wavered on the new restrictions 
that were to apply “to all future public utility issuances of secured and 
unsecured debt . . . .”155  Within a year of the Westar Order, Kandiyohi 
Electric Cooperative (Kandiyohi), a Minnesota company, submitted an 
application under section 204 of the FPA156 and part 34 of the Federal Energy 
 
 150. Id. (emphasis added). 
 151. See Salamone et al., supra note 41, at 30. 
 152. Westar Energy, Inc., 102 F.E.R.C. at 61512. 
 153. Id. 
 154. See id.; 16 U.S.C. § 824c(a) (2000); see also Application of Kandiyohi Power 
Cooperative for Authority to Issue Securities at 12, 106 F.E.R.C. 61010 (2004) (No. ES04-6-000) 
[hereinafter Application]. 
 155. Westar Energy, Inc., 102 F.E.R.C. at 61512. 
 156. 16 U.S.C. § 824c. 
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Regulatory Commission’s Regulations157 for authorization to issue 
securities.158  Because it would use such debt to finance both its regulated and 
unregulated activities, Kandiyohi sought exemption from the four criteria 
established by the FERC in the Westar Order.159  Specifically, Kandiyohi 
sought exemptions from the criteria set forth in the Westar Order for both 
member-owned cooperatives in general, and for itself in particular.160  
Kandiyohi explained that the commission in Westar was concerned over 
Westar’s credit rating and the shaky financial condition of the utility.161  
Furthermore, Kandiyohi noted the following: 
  The Westar restrictions appear to be designed to prevent investor-owned 
utilities’ (IOUs) stakeholders and management, whose interests are or may be 
different than the interests of utility customers, from taking actions which may 
ultimately jeopardize the utility’s ability to perform its utility function and may 
adversely affect its rate payers.162 
However, Kandiyohi argued that cooperatives are not susceptible to similar 
conflicts between owners and customers because cooperatives are owned by 
their customers (ratepayers).163  Consequently, Kandiyohi argued that the 
Westar restrictions were not justified, even though it qualified as a public 
utility company.164 
Kandiyohi then argued that the Westar restrictions were beyond the scope 
of the FERC.165  “[S]ection 204 of the FPA does not expressly prohibit public 
utilities from issuing securities to finance non-utility activities.”166  Kandiyohi 
explained that the FERC instituted the restrictions in Westar to prevent utilities 
 
 157. 18 C.F.R. §§ 34.1–34.10 (2003). 
 158. Application, supra note 154, at 1. 
 159. Id. at 8–9. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 9.  Kandiyohi elaborated on the commission’s decision in Westar, stating: 
These policy concerns arose in large part because the financial condition of IOUs, such as 
Westar, had deteriorated in large part due to their non-utility business activities.  With 
regard to Westar, the Commission found that since 1995 Westar had issued substantial 
amounts of new debt and used the proceeds to finance non-utility business ventures and to 
cover operating losses incurred by non-utility business.  These activities resulted in the 
following adverse consequences: the credit rating for Westar securities was reduced to 
“junk status”, Westar debt is more costly and more difficult to obtain on economically 
favorable terms, Westar’s ratepayers are at risk for paying the increased cost of debt if 
Westar cannot generate enough cash flow from utility operations to cover the increased 
debt costs; and Westar will be left with a disproportionate amount of debt if it “spins off” 
some or all of its non-utility businesses. 
Id. at 9 n.10. 
 162. Id. at 9–10. 
 163. Application, supra note 154, at 10. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 12. 
 166. Id. 
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from impairing their ability to function as regulated public utilities.167  In this 
instance, however, Kandiyohi argued that its use of utility asset-secured debt 
will not inhibit its ability to act as a utility, but will actually benefit the utility 
by funding its affiliated propane business.168  In essence, this was the exact 
same argument Westar made one year earlier in its efforts to fund its affiliate 
“Protection One.”169 
The FERC ultimately agreed with Kandiyohi and issued an order 
authorizing the issuance of the securities, exempting Kandiyohi itself from the 
Westar criteria, but denying the request to exempt all member-owned 
cooperatives.170  The FERC stated that “the Westar restrictions are not needed 
to protect Kandiyohi’s utility customers, and we will not impose them in this 
instance.”171 
Several months later, Midwest Energy, Inc. (Midwest), a Kansas utility 
company, filed a request pursuant to section 204 of the FPA to issue securities, 
and asked for the same exemption from the Westar criteria that Kandiyohi had 
received.172  Midwest argued that it should also be exempted from the FERC’s 
requirements due to its ownership composition and the benefits that Midwest 
would derive from the financing.173  The FERC subsequently approved 
Midwest’s application for the requested exemption and cited the Kandiyohi 
Order without providing additional justification.174 
 
 167. Id. 
 168. Application, supra note 154, at 12. 
Adequate financial support of its propane business allows Kandiyohi to diversify its 
interests protecting the financial security of the utility and its owner-customers.  Further, 
ensuring access to affordable propane supplies in rural areas served by Kandiyohi may 
encourage residents and current member-owners of the cooperative to remain in 
Kandiyohi’s electric service area. 
Id.  See generally Westar Energy, Inc., 102 F.E.R.C. 61186 (2003), 2003 WL 732901. 
 169. Kandiyohi was basically conveying the sentiment of the Invasion of Management 
rationale: absent a specific grant of statutory authority, the commission should not be permitted to 
dictate how a utility provides its services to the public. 
 170. Kandiyohi Power Cooperative, 106 F.E.R.C. 61010, 61024 (2004), 2004 WL 45465. 
 171. Id. 
 172. Application of Midwest Energy, Inc. for Authority to Issue Long-Term and Short-Term 
Debt at 3, No. ES04-17-000 (F.E.R.C. Mar. 26, 2004).  Midwest was going to use the utility 
asset-secured debt to fund one of its affiliates, Midwest United Energy (MUE).  Id. at 10.  “MUE 
is a natural gas marketer that provides Midwest Energy’s commercial and industrial customers 
with the option of accessing competitively-priced supplies of natural gas.  In addition, all profits 
earned by MUE are for the benefit of all of Midwest Energy’s customer-owners.”  Id. 
 173. Id. at 10. 
 174. Letter from Michael C. McLaughlin, Director, Division of Tariffs and Market 
Development, Federal Energy Regulatory Comission, to William N. Dowling, Vice President, 
Energy Management & Supply, Midwest Energy, Inc. (May 5, 2004), available at 
http://elibrary.ferc.gov/idmws/nvcommon/NVViewer.asp?Doc=10148472:0. 
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Thus, while the FERC originally intended that its new restrictions apply to 
all future public issuances of debt, it has since relaxed its requirements.  The 
restrictions imposed on Westar stemmed from abuses at Westar and other 
IOUs that used regulated asset-secured debt to fund unregulated businesses to 
the advantage of the stockholders.175  The FERC could have simply denied 
Westar’s request in the first place instead of imposing new requirements on all 
utilities.  Since the Westar decision, the FERC has refused to grant a 
broad/generic exemption to the Westar requirements to a group, but they have 
granted exemptions to individual entities when good cause was shown.  The 
fact that the FERC has issued specific exceptions to the Westar order 
immediately after developing the new requirements may indicate that the 
FERC did not envision the scope of the order it was handing down.  Thus, had 
the Invasion of Management defense been properly applied in the original 
Westar opinion, the FERC could have avoided the numerous utilities that have 
and will request exemptions to the Westar requirements.  Moreover, the FERC 
will certainly face additional scrutiny from the large number of utilities that 
currently diversify into unregulated affiliates. 
IV.  IMPLICATIONS OF PUBLIC UTILITY DIVERSIFICATION 
Public utilities rarely diversified prior to the mid 1970s, during which time 
public utilities were experiencing increasing profits due to a slow rise in 
costs.176  However, after this period, regulated utilities began to see their 
financial positions deteriorate, spurring diversification into unregulated areas 
of business.177  This allowed utilities to operate a portion of their business free 
from regulation imposed by commissions.178 
By preventing public utilities from financing non-utility businesses with 
debt secured by utility assets, the FERC effectively limited the ability of a 
utility to obtain favorable financing for non-utility investments.  Although 
some commentators have called for a statutory response to diversification into 
non-utility businesses,179 the FERC chose to formulate a response based on a 
 
 175. Unregulated investments are generally intended solely to benefit the stockholders, and 
recent abuses have underscored this fact.  Customers, on the other hand, often times do not 
benefit from this funding. 
 176. Fickinger, supra note 15, at 91. 
 177. Id.  “Increased costs are attributable to inflation, high interest rates, stricter 
environmental controls, and other regulatory requirements.”  Id. at 91 n.26 (citing CABOT 
CONSULTING GROUP, DIVERSIFICATION IN THE UTILITY INDUSTRY 2–3 (1982)).  Furthermore, 
“[a]s inflation has continually eroded interest coverage ratios for utilities since the 1960’s, bond 
rating agencies have responded by downgrading utility bond ratings and other security ratings.  
This trend began in earnest in 1972.  Accordingly, in the electric utility industry, stocks have sold 
below book value since 1973.”  Id. at 91 n.28. 
 178. Id. at 91–92. 
 179. See, e.g., id. at 116. 
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broad provision in the FPA, absent specific statutory support.180  Moreover, 
commissions do have limits beyond those specifically outlined in statute, and 
the Invasion of Management defense attempts to preserve public utility 
autonomy by upholding these limits.  “[A] comprehensive grant of public 
service commission jurisdiction extending over the public utility holding 
company’s non-utility operations must consider the limited levels of funding, 
manpower, and expertise available to commissions for this task.”181  If these 
resources are not available to commissions, there would be no interests served 
by extending a commission’s jurisdiction.182  Thus, when the FERC extended 
its jurisdiction to include Westar’s non-utility businesses, it greatly decreased 
the chance that any public utility will divest in unregulated affiliates in the 
future.  This is a major blow when one considers the competitive advantages 
sustained by larger diversified companies.183 
Several states have facilitated public utilities in their efforts to diversify.  
In Maryland, for example, the Maryland Public Service Commission rejected a 
proposal that would require utilities to obtain approval prior to any 
diversification initiatives, including diversification into unregulated 
 
 180. See Westar Energy, Inc., 102 F.E.R.C. 61186, 61512–13 (2003), 2003 WL 732901.  
Section 204 of the FPA requires utilities to obtain permission from FERC before issuing or 
assuming any securities.  16 U.S.C. § 824c(a) (2000).  Furthermore, before FERC will approve 
the request, there must be a showing of a lawful purpose and that there is some necessity for the 
issuance.  Id.  Subsection (b) of this act gives the commission broad power to supplement these 
orders: 
  The Commission, after opportunity for hearing, may grant any application under this 
section in whole or in part, and with such modifications and upon such terms and 
conditions as it may find necessary or appropriate, and may from time to time, after 
opportunity for hearing and for good cause shown, make such supplemental orders in the 
premises as it may find necessary or appropriate, and may by any such supplemental order 
modify the provisions of any previous order as to the particular purposes, uses, and extent 
to which, or the conditions under which, any security so theretofore authorized or the 
proceeds thereof may be applied, subject always to the requirements of subsection (a) of 
this section. 
Id. § 824c(b); see Application, supra note 154, at 12 (stating that “section 204 of the FPA does 
not expressly prohibit public utilities from issuing securities to finance non-utility activities”). 
 181. Fickinger, supra note 15, at 116–17.  The Commission is composed of five 
commissioners who are appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.  16 
U.S.C. § 792 (2000).  This group is in turn given the power “to appoint, prescribe the duties, and 
fix the salaries of, a secretary, a chief engineer, a general counsel, a solicitor, and a chief 
accountant; and . . . such other officers and employees as are necessary in the execution of its 
functions . . . .”  Id. § 793. 
 182. Fickinger, supra note 15, at 117. 
 183. See Frank J. Hanley & A. Gerald Harris, Does Diversification Increase the Cost of 
Equity Capital?, 128 PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 15, 1991, at 26, 26 (explaining that diversification 
decreases the total risk and subsequently the cost of equity to utilities); Michael V. Russo et al., 
Adding On: How to Make Diversification Work, 131 PUB. UTIL. FORT., Feb. 15, 1993, at 21, 25 
(describing the factors associated with and the benefits derived from successful diversification). 
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subsidiaries.184  The commission opined that “the state’s public service law 
only granted authority over rates and public utility services offered by a 
regulated company.  Preapproval of diversification activities was, thus, not 
required to assure just and reasonable rates and adequate provision of regulated 
services.”185  Consequently, the FERC’s new restrictions could have major 
implications in striking the balance between commissions and public utilities 
that diversify into unregulated businesses.  While states may afford greater 
freedom to the portion of public utility business that they govern, it is clear that 
the FERC will restrict some portions that they control. 
It is also important to note that the FERC’s concerns arose primarily from 
Westar’s “shaky” financial condition.  Thus, one must question why the FERC 
sought to impose its regulations on all future utilities.  Prior case law would 
indicate that the new restrictions imposed on all future public utility companies 
were unnecessary.  Opponents of diversification into non-utility businesses 
may argue that the utility customer should not be required to fund 
diversification investments that disproportionately benefit the shareholders 
over the customers.  These opponents, however, should draw on the precedent 
provided in Pacific Power & Light Co. v. Public Service Commission.186  
There, the court found that consumers cannot bear the risk of a faulty project 
unless the company obtains approval from the commission prior to undertaking 
the project.187  Thus, had Westar been attempting to pass on the costs of a 
failed project to its consumers, the commission could have justifiably stepped 
in.188  Westar, however, was only engaged in a debt issuance that could have 
negative implications in the future, but currently only constituted a decision of 
management.  If Westar’s affiliate, Protection One, would someday prove 
unprofitable, Westar would have to bear the cost of the failure instead of 
consumers. 
 
 184. Phillip S. Cross, MD. Rejects Restrictions on Diversification, 133 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 
Nov. 1, 1995, at 45, 45.  Baltimore Gas & Electric Company (BG&E) entered into a new business 
venture and began marketing merchandise and services in the area of kitchen remodeling.  Id.  
Ratepayers argued that BG&E was subsidizing this program from rates obtained through their 
regulated electric and gas business.  Id. 
 185. Id. 
 186. 677 P.2d 799 (Wyo. 1984). 
 187. Id. at 808–09.  The utility company could not levy the cost of a failed nuclear power 
construction project against ratepayers.  Id. at 806. 
 188. The Supreme Court of Wyoming has explained that a commission “is empowered to 
control the effect that new energy projects will have on rates—but only after the utility 
management has assessed the merits and drawbacks of the proposal and reached a final decision 
based on sound business judgment . . . .”  Id. at 810. 
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V.  THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 
The FERC recently promised to pursue other actions to prevent events 
similar to the Enron collapse and the California energy crisis.189  Specifically, 
FERC Chairman Pat Wood, III explained that “(1) FERC will seek to ensure 
‘the right rules’ are in place to encourage strong competition in energy 
markets; and (2) FERC will make efforts to monitor those markets more 
vigilantly.”190  The Westar conditions that will be imposed on all future debt 
issuances and the reporting requirements for all public utilities are examples of 
these initiatives at work.191  All future initiatives, however, should be analyzed 
under the Invasion of Management rationale. 
Thus, in order to come full circle, the Westar decision must be reconciled 
with the Invasion of Management rationale.  Courts regularly hold 
commissions’ actions “illegal,” but fail to provide a useable test for future 
courts to apply with some form of uniformity.192  If a test or standard is to be 
established, however, it “must be deduced from specific decision rather than 
from wandering opinion.”193  Consequently, one must piece together the 
rulings discussed in this Comment to understand the impact the Invasion of 
Management defense should have had on the Westar decision. 
As the cases outlined in this Comment have indicated, most statutes, on 
their face, only grant commissions the power to regulate public utilities when a 
utility’s actions could impact rates.194  However, general grants often 
accompany this power, and must be limited by the Invasion of Management 
defense.  A strict method of statutory interpretation195 would provide public 
utilities with the independence that management is entitled to have, and it 
would also establish a test that courts could uniformly apply in interpreting 
general statutory grants.  Although there are gray areas in general grants of 
power, courts should err on the side of management and allow the capitalist 
 
 189. See Salamone et al., supra note 41, at 30. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Management Invaded, supra note 23, at 118. 
 193. Id. 
 194. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 66-101b (2002); MO. REV. 
STAT. § 393.140(5) (2004). 
 195. According to Black’s Law Dictionary: 
  Strict construction of a statute is that which refuses to expand the law by implications 
or equitable considerations, but confines its operation to cases which are clearly within the 
letter of the statute, as well as within its spirit or reason, not so as to defeat the manifest 
purpose of the Legislature, but so as to resolve all reasonable doubts against the 
applicability of the statute to the particular case. 
  Strict interpretation is an equivocal expression, for it means either literal or narrow. 
When a provision is ambiguous, one of its meanings may be wider than the other, and the 
strict (i.e., narrow) sense is not necessarily the strict (i.e., literal) sense. 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 333 (8th ed. 2004) (citations omitted). 
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society that we operate in to take care of the rest.  It is clear that when states 
provide statutory grants of power to commissions, “the generally worded 
grants of power clearly refer to those services and facilities in the area of direct 
contact between the utility and the consumer.”196  In addition, cases have 
shown that “[c]ommission orders are uniformly upheld when the managerial 
decision ‘invaded’ is clearly within the area of direct consumer-utility 
contact.”197 
Westar’s proposed bond refinancing was well within management’s 
prerogative, and arguably outside the area of direct contact between the utility 
and the consumer.  Furthermore, even if financing an unregulated affiliate does 
involve direct contact between the utility and the consumer, commissions are 
not permitted to regulate how a utility provides services.198 
Had the court analyzed the Westar case under the Invasion of Management 
framework, the FERC’s new requirements would almost certainly have been 
prohibited, and problems in Kandiyohi and Midwest would have been avoided.  
As such, the Invasion of Management defense would have provided a clear test 
for the FERC to adhere to in issuing its order.  Less than ten miles away from 
Westar’s headquarters, a Kansas court explained the commissions’ bounds in 
the area of debt financing many years prior to the Westar Order, stating: 
  It must be kept in mind, of course, that the regulatory commission does not 
have the actual authority to revise a utility’s capital structure, per se, or to 
order the utility to change it into a different setup.  That is a prerogative of 
management which cannot be superseded by the substitution of regulatory 
opinion—that is to say, how much debt should be incurred or common stock 
issued.199 
Investors in public utilities must continue to receive protection from 
overzealous commissions.  These investors have a right to not only manage 
their property (a right indivisible from ownership), but also to earn a fair return 
on their investment.200  Moreover, numerous policy considerations exist for 
limiting utility regulation.201 
First, the physical composition of commissions restricts their ability to 
competently enter into the management of a public utility.202  Commissions are 
limited in personnel, time, and funding, and often lack a background of 
 
 196. Management Invaded, supra note 23, at 118. 
 197. Id. at 119. 
 198. Intuitively, financing a business deals with how a utility provides services to its 
customers. 
 199. Sekan Elec. Co-op. Ass’n. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 609 P.2d 188, 191 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1980) (quoting E. NICHOLS & F. WELCH, RULING PRINCIPLES OF UTILITY REGULATION, RATE 
OF RETURN SUPPLEMENT A 157 (1964)). 
 200. Management Invaded, supra note 23, at 125–26. 
 201. Id. at 126. 
 202. Id. 
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practical experience that would permit knowledgeable management of a 
utility.203  Commission’s decisions are necessarily based on “vicarious 
knowledge” composed of statistics and theories, rather than internal knowledge 
derived from long-term contact with utility operations.204  Furthermore, 
commissions frequently come under heavy pressure from consumer groups and 
civic groups lobbying for lower rates and extra services.205  Commissions often 
forget that their duty is to the public as a whole and not solely to the special 
interest group that complains the loudest.206 
Finally, and most importantly, continual regulation of public utilities can 
do nothing but weaken privately owned utilities.207  “If effective private 
management of utilities is paralyzed by continual forays of regulation, in the 
long run the public could be hurt most seriously by a continuing decrease in 
efficiency.”208  Intuitively, one can easily understand that a business that 
continually becomes less profitable will also be less attractive to investors.  It 
necessarily follows that incentives to invest will dwindle, along with 
compensation of upper-echelon management, middle management, and all 
other employees.  As a result, public utilities will become less efficient and 
poorly managed, eventually resulting in rate spikes to reverse the cycle. 
Consequently, the Invasion of Management defense is of practical 
application to any commission regulation that is not impressed with direct 
consumer–utility contact.  When applied correctly, the defense prevents 
commissions from continual forays into the management of a utility, forays 
that could ultimately prove detrimental to the utility and the public.209  
Moreover, the opinions in this area either expressly, or based on their rationale, 
indicate that the Invasion of Management defense is not moribund.  In the 
wake of Enron, and other similar situations, applying the Invasion of 
Management defense is a difficult task, but one that must be taken to preserve 
the model of public utilities that the United States currently operates under.  
The defense supplies a rationale that courts can apply much easier than wading 
through wandering opinions as many recent courts have been inclined to 
undertake.  Regardless of the disasters associated with deregulation in 
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California and the Enron crisis, “deregulation has brought consumers in certain 
states lower prices, greater choice, greater efficiency in generation, 
transmission, and distribution, preservation of reliable service, and 
environmental preservation.”210 
So, after more than fifty years, one question remains: What areas of 
management were truly intended to remain with management?  As the cases 
indicate, the test for when management has been invaded remains unclear to 
this day.  However, it is important to recognize that commissions cannot act 
beyond the intent of the general grants provided by state and federal 
legislation.  To do so would not only undermine the management of the public 
utility, but could also erode the current system by eliminating any profitability 
incident to private ownership.  It is important to again note that “utility 
regulation . . . depends on[] private ownership and management.  Nothing so 
far discovered in the Constitution prohibits public ownership of all utilities.  If 
the state legislatures had wished to own and manage utilities they could have 
done so.”211  As a result, courts must strike a balance between over-regulation 
and regulation necessary to protect the public.  To do so, the rationale intrinsic 
to the Invasion of Management defense must be considered. 
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